| Intuitionistic Logic Explorer Theorem List (p. 174 of 174) | < Previous Wrap > | |
| Bad symbols? Try the
GIF version. |
||
|
Mirrors > Metamath Home Page > ILE Home Page > Theorem List Contents > Recent Proofs This page: Page List |
||
| Type | Label | Description |
|---|---|---|
| Statement | ||
| Theorem | iooref1o 17301 | A one-to-one mapping from the real numbers onto the open unit interval. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 27-Jun-2024.) |
| ⊢ 𝐹 = (𝑥 ∈ ℝ ↦ (1 / (1 + (exp‘𝑥)))) ⇒ ⊢ 𝐹:ℝ–1-1-onto→(0(,)1) | ||
| Theorem | iooreen 17302 | An open interval is equinumerous to the real numbers. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 27-Jun-2024.) |
| ⊢ (0(,)1) ≈ ℝ | ||
| Theorem | rirrdisj 17303* | The rational and irrational numbers are disjoint. Here irrational means apart from any rational number. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 18-Sep-2026.) |
| ⊢ (ℚ ∩ {𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∣ ∀𝑞 ∈ ℚ 𝑥 # 𝑞}) = ∅ | ||
Omniscience principles refer to several propositions, most of them weaker than full excluded middle, which do not follow from the axioms of IZF set theory. They are: (0) the Principle of Omniscience (PO), which is another name for excluded middle (see exmidomni 7489), (1) the Limited Principle of Omniscience (LPO) is ω ∈ Omni (see df-omni 7482), (2) the Weak Limited Principle of Omniscience (WLPO) is ω ∈ WOmni (see df-womni 7511), (3) Markov's Principle (MP) is ω ∈ Markov (see df-markov 7499), (4) the Lesser Limited Principle of Omniscience (LLPO) is not yet defined in iset.mm. They also have analytic counterparts each of which follows from the corresponding omniscience principle: (1) Analytic LPO is real number trichotomy, ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ(𝑥 < 𝑦 ∨ 𝑥 = 𝑦 ∨ 𝑦 < 𝑥) (see trilpo 17311), (2) Analytic WLPO is decidability of real number equality, ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝDECID 𝑥 = 𝑦 (see redcwlpo 17324), (3) Analytic MP is ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ(𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 → 𝑥 # 𝑦) (see neapmkv 17337), (4) Analytic LLPO is real number dichotomy, ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ(𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∨ 𝑦 ≤ 𝑥) (most relevant current theorem is maxclpr 12012). | ||
| Theorem | trilpolemclim 17304* | Lemma for trilpo 17311. Convergence of the series. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 24-Aug-2023.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐹:ℕ⟶{0, 1}) & ⊢ 𝐺 = (𝑛 ∈ ℕ ↦ ((1 / (2↑𝑛)) · (𝐹‘𝑛))) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → seq1( + , 𝐺) ∈ dom ⇝ ) | ||
| Theorem | trilpolemcl 17305* | Lemma for trilpo 17311. The sum exists. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 23-Aug-2023.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐹:ℕ⟶{0, 1}) & ⊢ 𝐴 = Σ𝑖 ∈ ℕ ((1 / (2↑𝑖)) · (𝐹‘𝑖)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐴 ∈ ℝ) | ||
| Theorem | trilpolemisumle 17306* | Lemma for trilpo 17311. An upper bound for the sum of the digits beyond a certain point. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 28-Aug-2023.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐹:ℕ⟶{0, 1}) & ⊢ 𝐴 = Σ𝑖 ∈ ℕ ((1 / (2↑𝑖)) · (𝐹‘𝑖)) & ⊢ 𝑍 = (ℤ≥‘𝑀) & ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝑀 ∈ ℕ) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → Σ𝑖 ∈ 𝑍 ((1 / (2↑𝑖)) · (𝐹‘𝑖)) ≤ Σ𝑖 ∈ 𝑍 (1 / (2↑𝑖))) | ||
| Theorem | trilpolemgt1 17307* | Lemma for trilpo 17311. The 1 < 𝐴 case. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 23-Aug-2023.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐹:ℕ⟶{0, 1}) & ⊢ 𝐴 = Σ𝑖 ∈ ℕ ((1 / (2↑𝑖)) · (𝐹‘𝑖)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ¬ 1 < 𝐴) | ||
| Theorem | trilpolemeq1 17308* | Lemma for trilpo 17311. The 𝐴 = 1 case. This is proved by noting that if any (𝐹‘𝑥) is zero, then the infinite sum 𝐴 is less than one based on the term which is zero. We are using the fact that the 𝐹 sequence is decidable (in the sense that each element is either zero or one). (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 23-Aug-2023.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐹:ℕ⟶{0, 1}) & ⊢ 𝐴 = Σ𝑖 ∈ ℕ ((1 / (2↑𝑖)) · (𝐹‘𝑖)) & ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐴 = 1) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀𝑥 ∈ ℕ (𝐹‘𝑥) = 1) | ||
| Theorem | trilpolemlt1 17309* | Lemma for trilpo 17311. The 𝐴 < 1 case. We can use the distance between 𝐴 and one (that is, 1 − 𝐴) to find a position in the sequence 𝑛 where terms after that point will not add up to as much as 1 − 𝐴. By finomni 7487 we know the terms up to 𝑛 either contain a zero or are all one. But if they are all one that contradicts the way we constructed 𝑛, so we know that the sequence contains a zero. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 23-Aug-2023.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐹:ℕ⟶{0, 1}) & ⊢ 𝐴 = Σ𝑖 ∈ ℕ ((1 / (2↑𝑖)) · (𝐹‘𝑖)) & ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐴 < 1) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∃𝑥 ∈ ℕ (𝐹‘𝑥) = 0) | ||
| Theorem | trilpolemres 17310* | Lemma for trilpo 17311. The result. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 23-Aug-2023.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐹:ℕ⟶{0, 1}) & ⊢ 𝐴 = Σ𝑖 ∈ ℕ ((1 / (2↑𝑖)) · (𝐹‘𝑖)) & ⊢ (𝜑 → (𝐴 < 1 ∨ 𝐴 = 1 ∨ 1 < 𝐴)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → (∃𝑥 ∈ ℕ (𝐹‘𝑥) = 0 ∨ ∀𝑥 ∈ ℕ (𝐹‘𝑥) = 1)) | ||
| Theorem | trilpo 17311* |
Real number trichotomy implies the Limited Principle of Omniscience
(LPO). We expect that we'd need some form of countable choice to prove
the converse.
Here's the outline of the proof. Given an infinite sequence F of zeroes and ones, we need to show the sequence contains a zero or it is all ones. Construct a real number A whose representation in base two consists of a zero, a decimal point, and then the numbers of the sequence. Compare it with one using trichotomy. The three cases from trichotomy are trilpolemlt1 17309 (which means the sequence contains a zero), trilpolemeq1 17308 (which means the sequence is all ones), and trilpolemgt1 17307 (which is not possible). Equivalent ways to state real number trichotomy (sometimes called "analytic LPO") include decidability of real number apartness (see triap 17296) or that the real numbers are a discrete field (see trirec0 17312). LPO is known to not be provable in IZF (and most constructive foundations), so this theorem establishes that we will be unable to prove an analogue to qtri3or 10693 for real numbers. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 23-Aug-2023.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ (𝑥 < 𝑦 ∨ 𝑥 = 𝑦 ∨ 𝑦 < 𝑥) → ω ∈ Omni) | ||
| Theorem | trirec0 17312* |
Every real number having a reciprocal or equaling zero is equivalent to
real number trichotomy.
This is the key part of the definition of what is known as a discrete field, so "the real numbers are a discrete field" can be taken as an equivalent way to state real trichotomy (see further discussion at trilpo 17311). (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 10-Jun-2024.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ (𝑥 < 𝑦 ∨ 𝑥 = 𝑦 ∨ 𝑦 < 𝑥) ↔ ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ (∃𝑧 ∈ ℝ (𝑥 · 𝑧) = 1 ∨ 𝑥 = 0)) | ||
| Theorem | trirec0xor 17313* |
Version of trirec0 17312 with exclusive-or.
The definition of a discrete field is sometimes stated in terms of exclusive-or but as proved here, this is equivalent to inclusive-or because the two disjuncts cannot be simultaneously true. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 10-Jun-2024.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ (𝑥 < 𝑦 ∨ 𝑥 = 𝑦 ∨ 𝑦 < 𝑥) ↔ ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ (∃𝑧 ∈ ℝ (𝑥 · 𝑧) = 1 ⊻ 𝑥 = 0)) | ||
| Theorem | apdifflemf 17314 | Lemma for apdiff 17316. Being apart from the point halfway between 𝑄 and 𝑅 suffices for 𝐴 to be a different distance from 𝑄 and from 𝑅. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 18-May-2024.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐴 ∈ ℝ) & ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝑄 ∈ ℚ) & ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝑅 ∈ ℚ) & ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝑄 < 𝑅) & ⊢ (𝜑 → ((𝑄 + 𝑅) / 2) # 𝐴) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → (abs‘(𝐴 − 𝑄)) # (abs‘(𝐴 − 𝑅))) | ||
| Theorem | apdifflemr 17315 | Lemma for apdiff 17316. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 19-May-2024.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐴 ∈ ℝ) & ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝑆 ∈ ℚ) & ⊢ (𝜑 → (abs‘(𝐴 − -1)) # (abs‘(𝐴 − 1))) & ⊢ ((𝜑 ∧ 𝑆 ≠ 0) → (abs‘(𝐴 − 0)) # (abs‘(𝐴 − (2 · 𝑆)))) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐴 # 𝑆) | ||
| Theorem | apdiff 17316* | The irrationals (reals apart from any rational) are exactly those reals that are a different distance from every rational. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 17-May-2024.) |
| ⊢ (𝐴 ∈ ℝ → (∀𝑞 ∈ ℚ 𝐴 # 𝑞 ↔ ∀𝑞 ∈ ℚ ∀𝑟 ∈ ℚ (𝑞 ≠ 𝑟 → (abs‘(𝐴 − 𝑞)) # (abs‘(𝐴 − 𝑟))))) | ||
| Theorem | qdiff 17317* | The rationals are exactly those reals for which there exist two distinct rationals that are the same distance from the original number. Similar to apdiff 17316 but by stating the result positively we can completely sidestep the issue of not equal versus apart in the statement of the result. From an online post by Ingo Blechschmidt. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 24-Apr-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝐴 ∈ ℝ → (𝐴 ∈ ℚ ↔ ∃𝑞 ∈ ℚ ∃𝑟 ∈ ℚ (𝑞 ≠ 𝑟 ∧ (abs‘(𝐴 − 𝑞)) = (abs‘(𝐴 − 𝑟))))) | ||
| Theorem | iswomninnlem 17318* | Lemma for iswomnimap 7513. The result, with a hypothesis for convenience. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 20-Jun-2024.) |
| ⊢ 𝐺 = frec((𝑥 ∈ ℤ ↦ (𝑥 + 1)), 0) ⇒ ⊢ (𝐴 ∈ 𝑉 → (𝐴 ∈ WOmni ↔ ∀𝑓 ∈ ({0, 1} ↑𝑚 𝐴)DECID ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝑓‘𝑥) = 1)) | ||
| Theorem | iswomninn 17319* | Weak omniscience stated in terms of natural numbers. Similar to iswomnimap 7513 but it will sometimes be more convenient to use 0 and 1 rather than ∅ and 1o. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 20-Jun-2024.) |
| ⊢ (𝐴 ∈ 𝑉 → (𝐴 ∈ WOmni ↔ ∀𝑓 ∈ ({0, 1} ↑𝑚 𝐴)DECID ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝑓‘𝑥) = 1)) | ||
| Theorem | iswomni0 17320* | Weak omniscience stated in terms of equality with 0. Like iswomninn 17319 but with zero in place of one. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 24-Jul-2024.) |
| ⊢ (𝐴 ∈ 𝑉 → (𝐴 ∈ WOmni ↔ ∀𝑓 ∈ ({0, 1} ↑𝑚 𝐴)DECID ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝑓‘𝑥) = 0)) | ||
| Theorem | ismkvnnlem 17321* | Lemma for ismkvnn 17322. The result, with a hypothesis to give a name to an expression for convenience. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 25-Jun-2024.) |
| ⊢ 𝐺 = frec((𝑥 ∈ ℤ ↦ (𝑥 + 1)), 0) ⇒ ⊢ (𝐴 ∈ 𝑉 → (𝐴 ∈ Markov ↔ ∀𝑓 ∈ ({0, 1} ↑𝑚 𝐴)(¬ ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝑓‘𝑥) = 1 → ∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝑓‘𝑥) = 0))) | ||
| Theorem | ismkvnn 17322* | The predicate of being Markov stated in terms of set exponentiation. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 25-Jun-2024.) |
| ⊢ (𝐴 ∈ 𝑉 → (𝐴 ∈ Markov ↔ ∀𝑓 ∈ ({0, 1} ↑𝑚 𝐴)(¬ ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝑓‘𝑥) = 1 → ∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝑓‘𝑥) = 0))) | ||
| Theorem | redcwlpolemeq1 17323* | Lemma for redcwlpo 17324. A biconditionalized version of trilpolemeq1 17308. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 21-Jun-2024.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐹:ℕ⟶{0, 1}) & ⊢ 𝐴 = Σ𝑖 ∈ ℕ ((1 / (2↑𝑖)) · (𝐹‘𝑖)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → (𝐴 = 1 ↔ ∀𝑥 ∈ ℕ (𝐹‘𝑥) = 1)) | ||
| Theorem | redcwlpo 17324* |
Decidability of real number equality implies the Weak Limited Principle
of Omniscience (WLPO). We expect that we'd need some form of countable
choice to prove the converse.
Here's the outline of the proof. Given an infinite sequence F of zeroes and ones, we need to show the sequence is all ones or it is not. Construct a real number A whose representation in base two consists of a zero, a decimal point, and then the numbers of the sequence. This real number will equal one if and only if the sequence is all ones (redcwlpolemeq1 17323). Therefore decidability of real number equality would imply decidability of whether the sequence is all ones. Because of this theorem, decidability of real number equality is sometimes called "analytic WLPO". WLPO is known to not be provable in IZF (and most constructive foundations), so this theorem establishes that we will be unable to prove an analogue to qdceq 10697 for real numbers. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 20-Jun-2024.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ DECID 𝑥 = 𝑦 → ω ∈ WOmni) | ||
| Theorem | tridceq 17325* | Real trichotomy implies decidability of real number equality. Or in other words, analytic LPO implies analytic WLPO (see trilpo 17311 and redcwlpo 17324). Thus, this is an analytic analogue to lpowlpo 7515. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 24-Jul-2024.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ (𝑥 < 𝑦 ∨ 𝑥 = 𝑦 ∨ 𝑦 < 𝑥) → ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ DECID 𝑥 = 𝑦) | ||
| Theorem | redc0 17326* | Two ways to express decidability of real number equality. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 23-Jul-2024.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ DECID 𝑥 = 𝑦 ↔ ∀𝑧 ∈ ℝ DECID 𝑧 = 0) | ||
| Theorem | reap0 17327* | Real number trichotomy is equivalent to decidability of apartness from zero. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 27-Jul-2024.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ (𝑥 < 𝑦 ∨ 𝑥 = 𝑦 ∨ 𝑦 < 𝑥) ↔ ∀𝑧 ∈ ℝ DECID 𝑧 # 0) | ||
| Theorem | cndcap 17328* | Real number trichotomy is equivalent to decidability of complex number apartness. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 10-Apr-2025.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ (𝑥 < 𝑦 ∨ 𝑥 = 𝑦 ∨ 𝑦 < 𝑥) ↔ ∀𝑧 ∈ ℂ ∀𝑤 ∈ ℂ DECID 𝑧 # 𝑤) | ||
| Theorem | dceqnconst 17329* | Decidability of real number equality implies the existence of a certain non-constant function from real numbers to integers. Variation of Exercise 11.6(i) of [HoTT], p. (varies). See redcwlpo 17324 for more discussion of decidability of real number equality. (Contributed by BJ and Jim Kingdon, 24-Jun-2024.) (Revised by Jim Kingdon, 23-Jul-2024.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ DECID 𝑥 = 0 → ∃𝑓(𝑓:ℝ⟶ℤ ∧ (𝑓‘0) = 0 ∧ ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ+ (𝑓‘𝑥) ≠ 0)) | ||
| Theorem | dcapnconst 17330* |
Decidability of real number apartness implies the existence of a certain
non-constant function from real numbers to integers. Variation of
Exercise 11.6(i) of [HoTT], p. (varies).
See trilpo 17311 for more
discussion of decidability of real number apartness.
This is a weaker form of dceqnconst 17329 and in fact this theorem can be proved using dceqnconst 17329 as shown at dcapnconstALT 17331. (Contributed by BJ and Jim Kingdon, 24-Jun-2024.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ DECID 𝑥 # 0 → ∃𝑓(𝑓:ℝ⟶ℤ ∧ (𝑓‘0) = 0 ∧ ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ+ (𝑓‘𝑥) ≠ 0)) | ||
| Theorem | dcapnconstALT 17331* | Decidability of real number apartness implies the existence of a certain non-constant function from real numbers to integers. A proof of dcapnconst 17330 by means of dceqnconst 17329. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 27-Jul-2024.) (New usage is discouraged.) (Proof modification is discouraged.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ DECID 𝑥 # 0 → ∃𝑓(𝑓:ℝ⟶ℤ ∧ (𝑓‘0) = 0 ∧ ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ+ (𝑓‘𝑥) ≠ 0)) | ||
| Theorem | nconstwlpolem0 17332* | Lemma for nconstwlpo 17335. If all the terms of the series are zero, so is their sum. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 26-Jul-2024.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐺:ℕ⟶{0, 1}) & ⊢ 𝐴 = Σ𝑖 ∈ ℕ ((1 / (2↑𝑖)) · (𝐺‘𝑖)) & ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀𝑥 ∈ ℕ (𝐺‘𝑥) = 0) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐴 = 0) | ||
| Theorem | nconstwlpolemgt0 17333* | Lemma for nconstwlpo 17335. If one of the terms of series is positive, so is the sum. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 26-Jul-2024.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐺:ℕ⟶{0, 1}) & ⊢ 𝐴 = Σ𝑖 ∈ ℕ ((1 / (2↑𝑖)) · (𝐺‘𝑖)) & ⊢ (𝜑 → ∃𝑥 ∈ ℕ (𝐺‘𝑥) = 1) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → 0 < 𝐴) | ||
| Theorem | nconstwlpolem 17334* | Lemma for nconstwlpo 17335. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 23-Jul-2024.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐹:ℝ⟶ℤ) & ⊢ (𝜑 → (𝐹‘0) = 0) & ⊢ ((𝜑 ∧ 𝑥 ∈ ℝ+) → (𝐹‘𝑥) ≠ 0) & ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐺:ℕ⟶{0, 1}) & ⊢ 𝐴 = Σ𝑖 ∈ ℕ ((1 / (2↑𝑖)) · (𝐺‘𝑖)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → (∀𝑦 ∈ ℕ (𝐺‘𝑦) = 0 ∨ ¬ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℕ (𝐺‘𝑦) = 0)) | ||
| Theorem | nconstwlpo 17335* | Existence of a certain non-constant function from reals to integers implies ω ∈ WOmni (the Weak Limited Principle of Omniscience or WLPO). Based on Exercise 11.6(ii) of [HoTT], p. (varies). (Contributed by BJ and Jim Kingdon, 22-Jul-2024.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐹:ℝ⟶ℤ) & ⊢ (𝜑 → (𝐹‘0) = 0) & ⊢ ((𝜑 ∧ 𝑥 ∈ ℝ+) → (𝐹‘𝑥) ≠ 0) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ω ∈ WOmni) | ||
| Theorem | neapmkvlem 17336* | Lemma for neapmkv 17337. The result, with a few hypotheses broken out for convenience. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 25-Jun-2024.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐹:ℕ⟶{0, 1}) & ⊢ 𝐴 = Σ𝑖 ∈ ℕ ((1 / (2↑𝑖)) · (𝐹‘𝑖)) & ⊢ ((𝜑 ∧ 𝐴 ≠ 1) → 𝐴 # 1) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → (¬ ∀𝑥 ∈ ℕ (𝐹‘𝑥) = 1 → ∃𝑥 ∈ ℕ (𝐹‘𝑥) = 0)) | ||
| Theorem | neapmkv 17337* | If negated equality for real numbers implies apartness, Markov's Principle follows. Exercise 11.10 of [HoTT], p. (varies). (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 24-Jun-2024.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ (𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 → 𝑥 # 𝑦) → ω ∈ Markov) | ||
| Theorem | neap0mkv 17338* | The analytic Markov principle can be expressed either with two arbitrary real numbers, or one arbitrary number and zero. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 23-Feb-2025.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ (𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 → 𝑥 # 𝑦) ↔ ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ (𝑥 ≠ 0 → 𝑥 # 0)) | ||
| Theorem | ltlenmkv 17339* | If < can be expressed as holding exactly when ≤ holds and the values are not equal, then the analytic Markov's Principle applies. (To get the regular Markov's Principle, combine with neapmkv 17337). (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 23-Feb-2025.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ (𝑥 < 𝑦 ↔ (𝑥 ≤ 𝑦 ∧ 𝑦 ≠ 𝑥)) → ∀𝑥 ∈ ℝ ∀𝑦 ∈ ℝ (𝑥 ≠ 𝑦 → 𝑥 # 𝑦)) | ||
| Theorem | supfz 17340 | The supremum of a finite sequence of integers. (Contributed by Scott Fenton, 8-Aug-2013.) (Revised by Jim Kingdon, 15-Oct-2022.) |
| ⊢ (𝑁 ∈ (ℤ≥‘𝑀) → sup((𝑀...𝑁), ℤ, < ) = 𝑁) | ||
| Theorem | inffz 17341 | The infimum of a finite sequence of integers. (Contributed by Scott Fenton, 8-Aug-2013.) (Revised by Jim Kingdon, 15-Oct-2022.) |
| ⊢ (𝑁 ∈ (ℤ≥‘𝑀) → inf((𝑀...𝑁), ℤ, < ) = 𝑀) | ||
| Theorem | taupi 17342 | Relationship between τ and π. This can be seen as connecting the ratio of a circle's circumference to its radius and the ratio of a circle's circumference to its diameter. (Contributed by Jim Kingdon, 19-Feb-2019.) (Revised by AV, 1-Oct-2020.) |
| ⊢ τ = (2 · π) | ||
| Theorem | ax1hfs 17343 | Heyting's formal system Axiom #1 from [Heyting] p. 127. (Contributed by MM, 11-Aug-2018.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → (𝜑 ∧ 𝜑)) | ||
| Theorem | dftest 17344 |
A proposition is testable iff its negative or double-negative is true.
See Chapter 2 [Moschovakis] p. 2.
We do not formally define testability with a new token, but instead use DECID ¬ before the formula in question. For example, DECID ¬ 𝑥 = 𝑦 corresponds to "𝑥 = 𝑦 is testable". (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 13-Aug-2018.) For statements about testable propositions, search for the keyword "testable" in the comments of statements, for instance using the Metamath command "MM> SEARCH * "testable" / COMMENTS". (New usage is discouraged.) |
| ⊢ (DECID ¬ 𝜑 ↔ (¬ 𝜑 ∨ ¬ ¬ 𝜑)) | ||
These are definitions and proofs involving the "allsome" quantifier (aka "all some"). In informal language, statements like "All Martians are green" imply that there is at least one Martian. But it's easy to mistranslate informal language into formal notations because similar statements like ∀𝑥𝜑 → 𝜓 do not imply that 𝜑 is ever true, leading to vacuous truths. Some systems include a mechanism to counter this, e.g., PVS allows types to be appended with "+" to declare that they are nonempty. This section presents a different solution to the same problem. The "allsome" quantifier expressly includes the notion of both "all" and "there exists at least one" (aka some), and is defined to make it easier to more directly express both notions. The hope is that if a quantifier more directly expresses this concept, it will be used instead and reduce the risk of creating formal expressions that look okay but in fact are mistranslations. The term "allsome" was chosen because it's short, easy to say, and clearly hints at the two concepts it combines. I do not expect this to be used much in Metamath, because in Metamath there's a general policy of avoiding the use of new definitions unless there are very strong reasons to do so. Instead, my goal is to rigorously define this quantifier and demonstrate a few basic properties of it. The syntax allows two forms that look like they would be problematic, but they are fine. When applied to a top-level implication we allow ∀∃𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓), and when restricted (applied to a class) we allow ∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓). The first symbol after the setvar variable must always be ∈ if it is the form applied to a class, and since ∈ cannot begin a wff, it is unambiguous. The → looks like it would be a problem because 𝜑 or 𝜓 might include implications, but any implication arrow → within any wff must be surrounded by parentheses, so only the implication arrow of ∀∃ can follow the wff. The implication syntax would work fine without the parentheses, but I added the parentheses because it makes things clearer inside larger complex expressions, and it's also more consistent with the rest of the syntax. Naming: "als" is allsome. The form restricted to a class is prefixed with "r", following the way set.mm names the restricted quantifiers it is built from: ∀ gives df-ral 2533 and ∃ gives df-rex 2534, so df-als 17347 (the general form) gives df-rals 17348 (the restricted form). Earlier versions of this material differed, so old references may not match. They wrote the quantifier as an "inverted A" followed by an exclamation point, and they named the general form df-alsi and the restricted form df-alsc. The symbol is now an "inverted A" followed by a "backwards E", which more readers can correctly guess without being taught it. The restricted definition also changed, and the older one was a mistake; see df-rals 17348 for what was wrong with it. This database is intuitionistic, so some of this material differs from its counterpart in set.mm. In particular, a class 𝐴 being inhabited (∃𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝐴) is a stronger claim here than its being nonempty (𝐴 ≠ ∅); see n0r 3535. The allsome quantifier asserts that a witness exists, which is the stronger notion, so where set.mm states a result using 𝐴 ≠ ∅ the corresponding result here uses inhabitedness instead. Such results are named with a trailing "m", following the convention of r19.2m 3614 and abn0m 3547. Results of set.mm that rely on recovering a witness from 𝐴 ≠ ∅ are omitted, since that step is not available here. For more, see "The Allsome Quantifier" by David A. Wheeler at https://dwheeler.com/essays/allsome.html 3547 I hope that others will eventually agree that allsome is awesome. | ||
| Syntax | wals 17345 | Extend wff definition to include "all some" applied to a top-level implication, which means 𝜓 is true whenever 𝜑 is true, and there is at least one 𝑥 where 𝜑 is true. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 20-Oct-2018.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| wff ∀∃𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) | ||
| Syntax | wrals 17346 | Extend wff definition to include "all some" applied to a class, which means 𝜓 is true whenever 𝜑 is true for 𝑥 in 𝐴, and there is at least one 𝑥 in 𝐴 where 𝜑 is true. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 20-Oct-2018.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| wff ∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) | ||
| Definition | df-als 17347 | Define "all some" applied to a top-level implication, which means 𝜓 is true whenever 𝜑 is true and there is at least one 𝑥 where 𝜑 is true. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 20-Oct-2018.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ (∀𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) ∧ ∃𝑥𝜑)) | ||
| Definition | df-rals 17348 |
Define "all some" applied to a class, which means 𝜓 is true
whenever
𝜑 is true for 𝑥 in 𝐴, and
there is at least one 𝑥 in
𝐴 where 𝜑 is true.
An older definition of the "all some" quantifier when scoped to a class, named df-alsc and now removed, instead applied a bare formula 𝜑 to the members of a class, asserting only (∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴𝜑 ∧ ∃𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝐴), that is, that the formula held throughout 𝐴 and that 𝐴 had at least one member. I've now decided that that was a mistake. Its older existence conjunct ∃𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 did not require any member of 𝐴 to satisfy the antecedent, so if the formula was itself an implication, that inner implication could still be vacuously true, which is precisely what the allsome quantifier exists to prevent. For example, the older definition meant that "among Martians, all tall ones are green" could be considered true if there are Martians, but no tall Martians. This version of the definition instead ensures that claims of the form "among Martians, all tall ones are green" can only be true if all tall Martians are green and that there is at least one tall Martian. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 20-Oct-2018.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ (∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝜑 → 𝜓) ∧ ∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑)) | ||
| Theorem | dfrals2 17349 | The bounded "all some" form is the general form with the class membership folded into the antecedent. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Oct-2018.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ ∀∃𝑥((𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 ∧ 𝜑) → 𝜓)) | ||
| Theorem | alsd 17350 | Introduction rule: "all some" holds if the "for all" part holds and the antecedent has a witness. This is the converse of als1d 17352 and als2d 17353 taken together, and is what lets an "all some" statement be proved rather than merely taken apart. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀𝑥(𝜓 → 𝜒)) & ⊢ (𝜑 → ∃𝑥𝜓) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃𝑥(𝜓 → 𝜒)) | ||
| Theorem | ralsd 17351 | Introduction rule for "all some" restricted to a class. This is the converse of rals1d 17354 and rals2d 17355 taken together. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝜓 → 𝜒)) & ⊢ (𝜑 → ∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜓) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜓 → 𝜒)) | ||
| Theorem | als1d 17352 | Deduction rule: Given "all some" applied to a top-level inference, you can extract the "for all" part. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 20-Oct-2018.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃𝑥(𝜓 → 𝜒)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀𝑥(𝜓 → 𝜒)) | ||
| Theorem | als2d 17353 | Deduction rule: Given "all some" applied to a top-level inference, you can extract the "exists" part. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 20-Oct-2018.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃𝑥(𝜓 → 𝜒)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∃𝑥𝜓) | ||
| Theorem | rals1d 17354 | Deduction rule: Given "all some" applied to a class, you can extract the "for all" part. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 20-Oct-2018.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜓 → 𝜒)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝜓 → 𝜒)) | ||
| Theorem | rals2d 17355 | Deduction rule: Given "all some" applied to a class, you can extract the "there exists" part. Note that the witness must satisfy the antecedent 𝜓, not merely be a member of 𝐴. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 20-Oct-2018.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜓 → 𝜒)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜓) | ||
| Theorem | ralsn0d 17356* | Deduction rule: Given "all some" applied to a class, the class is not the empty set. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 23-Oct-2018.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜓 → 𝜒)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → 𝐴 ≠ ∅) | ||
| Theorem | ralsmd 17357* | Deduction rule: Given "all some" applied to a class, the class is inhabited. This is stronger than ralsn0d 17356, which only concludes that the class is nonempty; see n0r 3535. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 20-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜓 → 𝜒)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∃𝑥 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴) | ||
| Theorem | alsex 17358 | The consequent of an "all some" is witnessed: if 𝜓 holds of every 𝑥 satisfying 𝜑, and some 𝑥 satisfies 𝜑, then some 𝑥 satisfies 𝜓. This is the positive counterpart of als-no-surprise 17366, and it is the property that ordinary "for all" with implication lacks: from ∀𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) alone nothing whatever follows about 𝜓, since nothing need satisfy 𝜑. It is the allsome quantifier says what a speaker of "all Martians are green" usually means. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) → ∃𝑥𝜓) | ||
| Theorem | ralsex 17359 | The consequent of an "all some" restricted to a class is witnessed: some member of 𝐴 satisfying 𝜑 also satisfies 𝜓. Restricted counterpart of alsex 17358. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) → ∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜓) | ||
| Theorem | alsbii 17360 | Congruence: equivalents may be substituted inside an "all some". (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 ↔ 𝜒) & ⊢ (𝜓 ↔ 𝜃) ⇒ ⊢ (∀∃𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ ∀∃𝑥(𝜒 → 𝜃)) | ||
| Theorem | ralsbii 17361 | Congruence for "all some" restricted to a class. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 ↔ 𝜒) & ⊢ (𝜓 ↔ 𝜃) ⇒ ⊢ (∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ ∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜒 → 𝜃)) | ||
| Theorem | alsbid 17362 | Deduction form of alsbii 17360. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥𝜑 & ⊢ (𝜑 → (𝜓 ↔ 𝜃)) & ⊢ (𝜑 → (𝜒 ↔ 𝜏)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → (∀∃𝑥(𝜓 → 𝜒) ↔ ∀∃𝑥(𝜃 → 𝜏))) | ||
| Theorem | nfals 17363 | Bound-variable hypothesis builder for "all some". (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥𝜑 & ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥𝜓 ⇒ ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥∀∃𝑦(𝜑 → 𝜓) | ||
| Theorem | nfrals 17364* | Bound-variable hypothesis builder for "all some" restricted to a class. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥𝐴 & ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥𝜑 & ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥𝜓 ⇒ ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥∀∃𝑦 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) | ||
| Theorem | cbvals 17365* | Rule used to change bound variables, using implicit substitution. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝑥 = 𝑦 → (𝜑 ↔ 𝜒)) & ⊢ (𝑥 = 𝑦 → (𝜓 ↔ 𝜃)) ⇒ ⊢ (∀∃𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ ∀∃𝑦(𝜒 → 𝜃)) | ||
| Theorem | als-no-surprise 17366 | Demonstrate that there is never a "surprise" when using the allsome quantifier, that is, it is never possible for the consequent to be both always true and always false. This uses the definition of df-als 17347: the universal parts give ∀𝑥¬ 𝜑, which contradicts the witness that the allsome quantifier supplies. Ordinary "for all" with implication has no such property, since ∀𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) and ∀𝑥(𝜑 → ¬ 𝜓) can both hold when nothing satisfies 𝜑. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 27-Oct-2018.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 20-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ ¬ (∀∃𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) ∧ ∀∃𝑥(𝜑 → ¬ 𝜓)) | ||
| Theorem | rals-no-surprise 17367 | Demonstrate that there is never a "surprise" when using the allsome quantifier restricted to a class, that is, it is never possible for the consequent to be both always true and always false of the members of 𝐴 that satisfy the antecedent. This is the restricted counterpart of als-no-surprise 17366, and follows from it by dfrals2 17349. Note that this holds without any assumption that 𝐴 is inhabited; that is the point of allsome, since the corresponding claim for the ordinary restricted "for all" fails when nothing in 𝐴 satisfies 𝜑. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 12-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ ¬ (∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) ∧ ∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → ¬ 𝜓)) | ||
| Theorem | ralrals 17368 | If the universal part of a restricted "all some" statement holds, then the statement reduces to the existence of a member of 𝐴 satisfying its antecedent. This is the restricted counterpart of ralals 17374. (Contributed by Peter Mazsa and David A. Wheeler, 20-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝜑 → 𝜓) → (∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ ∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑)) | ||
| Theorem | rexrals 17369 | If a member of 𝐴 satisfying the antecedent exists, then a restricted "all some" statement reduces to its universal part. This is the restricted counterpart of rexals 17375. (Contributed by Peter Mazsa and David A. Wheeler, 20-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑 → (∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝜑 → 𝜓))) | ||
| Theorem | alsanmo 17370 | An "all some" statement conjoined with the claim that at most one 𝑥 satisfies its antecedent is equivalent to the universal part conjoined with the claim that exactly one 𝑥 satisfies the antecedent. The "all some" quantifier supplies the existence of such an 𝑥 and ∃*𝑥𝜑 supplies the at-most-one part, so together they yield ∃!𝑥𝜑. (Contributed by Peter Mazsa and David A. Wheeler, 20-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ ((∀∃𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) ∧ ∃*𝑥𝜑) ↔ (∀𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) ∧ ∃!𝑥𝜑)) | ||
| Theorem | ralsanmo 17371 | An "all some" statement restricted to a class, conjoined with the claim that at most one 𝑥 in 𝐴 satisfies its antecedent, is equivalent to the universal part conjoined with the claim that exactly one 𝑥 in 𝐴 satisfies the antecedent. This is the restricted counterpart of alsanmo 17370. (Contributed by Peter Mazsa and David A. Wheeler, 20-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ ((∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) ∧ ∃*𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑) ↔ (∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝜑 → 𝜓) ∧ ∃!𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑)) | ||
| Theorem | alsralrex 17372* | The general "all some" quantifier with class membership as its antecedent holds if and only if 𝜑 holds for every 𝑥 in 𝐴 and some 𝑥 in 𝐴 satisfies 𝜑. (Contributed by Peter Mazsa, 27-Nov-2018.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 20-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 → 𝜑) ↔ (∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑 ∧ ∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑)) | ||
| Theorem | alsraln0m 17373* | The general "all some" quantifier with class membership as its antecedent holds if and only if 𝜑 holds for every 𝑥 in 𝐴 and 𝐴 is inhabited. This is the intuitionistic form of what set.mm states using 𝐴 ≠ ∅; see the section comment. (Contributed by Peter Mazsa, 28-Nov-2018.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 20-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 → 𝜑) ↔ (∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑 ∧ ∃𝑥 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴)) | ||
| Theorem | ralals 17374* | If 𝜑 holds for every 𝑥 in 𝐴, then the general "all some" quantifier with class membership as its antecedent reduces to the assertion that some 𝑥 in 𝐴 satisfies 𝜑. See ralrals 17368 for the restricted counterpart. (Contributed by Peter Mazsa, 19-Dec-2018.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 15-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑 → (∀∃𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 → 𝜑) ↔ ∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑)) | ||
| Theorem | rexals 17375* | If some 𝑥 in 𝐴 satisfies 𝜑, then the general "all some" quantifier with class membership as its antecedent reduces to the assertion that 𝜑 holds for every 𝑥 in 𝐴. See rexrals 17369 for the restricted counterpart. (Contributed by Peter Mazsa, 19-Dec-2018.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 15-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑 → (∀∃𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 → 𝜑) ↔ ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑)) | ||
| Theorem | n0alsm 17376* | If 𝐴 is inhabited, then the general "all some" quantifier with class membership as its antecedent reduces to the assertion that 𝜑 holds for every 𝑥 in 𝐴. (Contributed by Peter Mazsa, 19-Dec-2018.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 20-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∃𝑥 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 → (∀∃𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 → 𝜑) ↔ ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑)) | ||
| Theorem | 2alsraln0m 17377* | Nested general "all some" quantifiers with class membership as their antecedents: 𝜑 holds for every 𝑥 in 𝐴 and every 𝑦 in 𝐵, and both 𝐴 and 𝐵 are inhabited. (Contributed by Peter Mazsa, 28-May-2019.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 20-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 → ∀∃𝑦(𝑦 ∈ 𝐵 → 𝜑)) ↔ (∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 ∀𝑦 ∈ 𝐵 𝜑 ∧ (∃𝑥 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 ∧ ∃𝑦 𝑦 ∈ 𝐵))) | ||
| Theorem | 2alsraln0idm 17378* | Nested general "all some" quantifiers with class membership as their antecedents, for the same class 𝐴: 𝜑 holds for every 𝑥 and every 𝑦 in 𝐴, and 𝐴 is inhabited. (Contributed by Peter Mazsa, 28-May-2019.) (Revised by David A. Wheeler, 20-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃𝑥(𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 → ∀∃𝑦(𝑦 ∈ 𝐴 → 𝜑)) ↔ (∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 ∀𝑦 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑 ∧ ∃𝑥 𝑥 ∈ 𝐴)) | ||
These are definitions and proofs involving the "allsome one" quantifier, which extends the "allsome" quantifier of the previous section in the same way that ∃! (df-eu 2089) extends ∃. Some systems extend "there exists" by appending a character to it. If a system provides such an extension, it should provide it for allsome as well: append the same character, let it modify allsome's existence conjunct, and change nothing else. Appending "!" gives "allsome one", so ∀∃!𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) means that 𝜓 is true whenever 𝜑 is true and that exactly one 𝑥 satisfies 𝜑. This is what the English word "the" usually does. "The king is hungry" claims that a king exists, that there is only one, and that he is hungry, and the form ∀∃!𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) claims exactly that kind of statement (specifically when 𝜑 means 𝑥 is a king and 𝜓 means 𝑥 is hungry). English says all of that in a single phrase, and the first two have a dedicated word ("the") for the construct. Many other languages have their own dedicated way of saying this. Languages reserve that kind of compression for what their speakers need constantly, which is a good reason for a formal notation to be able to say it just as directly, rather than spelling it out afresh as a conjunction of two quantified formulas every time it comes up. Russell analyzed such definite descriptions with this apparatus in "On Denoting", where his example of a phrase that appears to refer to someone but in fact denotes no one at all is "the present King of France", item (1) of [Russell1905] p. 479, France being a republic that has no king. Write "the king is hungry" as ∀𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) instead and only the last of those three claims survives. The existence claim is silently gone, since that formula is vacuously true when there is no king, and the uniqueness claim is silently gone as well, since that formula holds just the same when there are five kings. Russell reached the opposite verdict for the same example, remarking that every proposition of the form "the present King of France ..." is false, [Russell1905] p. 482. The reason to care is the reason that motivates allsome, only more so. Note that this is not merely a way of writing ∃!𝑥(𝜑 ∧ 𝜓). Reading 𝜑 as "is a king" and 𝜓 as "is hungry", ∃!𝑥(𝜑 ∧ 𝜓) says that there is exactly one hungry king, whereas ∀∃!𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) says that there is exactly one king and that he is hungry. The first is true in a region with five kings exactly one of whom is hungry; the second is false there. Uniqueness attaches to the antecedent, not to the conjunction. See dfalseu2 17396 for the exact relationship between the two and alseueu 17397 for the one direction that does hold. Naming: "alseu" is allsome ("als", as in df-als 17347) extended with "exactly one" ("eu", as in df-eu 2089). The form restricted to a class is prefixed with "r", following df-rals 17348 and df-reu 2535, giving df-ralseu 17382. This database is intuitionistic, but nothing in this section depends on excluded middle, so every statement here has the same form as its counterpart in set.mm. That is unlike the allsome section above, where results that recover a witness from 𝐴 ≠ ∅ are omitted or restated in terms of inhabitedness. Soundness: df-alseu 17381 and df-ralseu 17382 are eliminable and conservative directly, so neither needs a justification theorem. Definitions are required to be eliminable and conservative; see the section comment for df-bi 117. Each is a biconditional whose left side is a new syntax construct (walseu 17379 or wralseu 17380) applied to distinct metavariables, and whose right side uses only constructs introduced earlier (∀, ∃!, ∧, →, and the restricted quantifiers df-ral 2533 and df-reu 2535), so any occurrence of the new construct can be replaced by the right side, which is eliminability. Conservativity follows, since a proof of a statement not mentioning ∀∃! can have every use of the definition replaced in this way. Every variable occurring on the right side already occurs on the left side, so no dummy variable is introduced, and introducing a dummy variable whose choice must be shown not to matter is the only circumstance here that would call for a justification theorem. For more, see "The Allsome Quantifier" by David A. Wheeler at https://dwheeler.com/essays/allsome.html 2535 | ||
| Syntax | walseu 17379 | Extend wff definition to include "all some one" applied to a top-level implication, which means 𝜓 is true whenever 𝜑 is true, and exactly one 𝑥 satisfies 𝜑. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| wff ∀∃!𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) | ||
| Syntax | wralseu 17380 | Extend wff definition to include "all some one" applied to a class, which means 𝜓 is true whenever 𝜑 is true for 𝑥 in 𝐴, and exactly one 𝑥 in 𝐴 satisfies 𝜑. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| wff ∀∃!𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) | ||
| Definition | df-alseu 17381 | Define "all some one" applied to a top-level implication, which means 𝜓 is true whenever 𝜑 is true and exactly one 𝑥 satisfies 𝜑. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃!𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ (∀𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) ∧ ∃!𝑥𝜑)) | ||
| Definition | df-ralseu 17382 | Define "all some one" applied to a class, which means 𝜓 is true whenever 𝜑 is true for 𝑥 in 𝐴, and exactly one 𝑥 in 𝐴 satisfies 𝜑. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃!𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ (∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝜑 → 𝜓) ∧ ∃!𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜑)) | ||
| Theorem | dfralseu2 17383 | The bounded "all some one" form is the general form with the class membership folded into the antecedent. This is the "all some one" counterpart of dfrals2 17349. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃!𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ ∀∃!𝑥((𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 ∧ 𝜑) → 𝜓)) | ||
| Theorem | alseuals 17384 | "All some one" implies "all some": requiring exactly one witness is stronger than requiring at least one. Any consequence of an allsome statement is therefore a consequence of the corresponding "all some one" statement, which is how alseu-no-surprise 17398 is proved. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃!𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) → ∀∃𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓)) | ||
| Theorem | ralseurals 17385 | "All some one" restricted to a class implies "all some" restricted to that class. Restricted counterpart of alseuals 17384. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃!𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) → ∀∃𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓)) | ||
| Theorem | alseud 17386 | Introduction rule: "all some one" holds if the "for all" part holds and the antecedent has exactly one witness. This is the converse of alseu1d 17388 and alseu2d 17389 taken together. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀𝑥(𝜓 → 𝜒)) & ⊢ (𝜑 → ∃!𝑥𝜓) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃!𝑥(𝜓 → 𝜒)) | ||
| Theorem | ralseud 17387 | Introduction rule for "all some one" restricted to a class. This is the converse of ralseu1d 17390 and ralseu2d 17391 taken together. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝜓 → 𝜒)) & ⊢ (𝜑 → ∃!𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜓) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃!𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜓 → 𝜒)) | ||
| Theorem | alseu1d 17388 | Deduction rule: Given "all some one" applied to a top-level inference, you can extract the "for all" part. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃!𝑥(𝜓 → 𝜒)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀𝑥(𝜓 → 𝜒)) | ||
| Theorem | alseu2d 17389 | Deduction rule: Given "all some one" applied to a top-level inference, you can extract the "exactly one" part. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃!𝑥(𝜓 → 𝜒)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∃!𝑥𝜓) | ||
| Theorem | ralseu1d 17390 | Deduction rule: Given "all some one" applied to a class, you can extract the "for all" part. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃!𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜓 → 𝜒)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 (𝜓 → 𝜒)) | ||
| Theorem | ralseu2d 17391 | Deduction rule: Given "all some one" applied to a class, you can extract the "exactly one" part. Note that the witness must satisfy the antecedent 𝜓, not merely be a member of 𝐴. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 → ∀∃!𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜓 → 𝜒)) ⇒ ⊢ (𝜑 → ∃!𝑥 ∈ 𝐴 𝜓) | ||
| Theorem | alseubii 17392 | Congruence: equivalents may be substituted inside an "all some one". This is the "all some one" counterpart of alsbii 17360. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 ↔ 𝜒) & ⊢ (𝜓 ↔ 𝜃) ⇒ ⊢ (∀∃!𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ ∀∃!𝑥(𝜒 → 𝜃)) | ||
| Theorem | ralseubii 17393 | Congruence for "all some one" restricted to a class. This is the "all some one" counterpart of ralsbii 17361. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (𝜑 ↔ 𝜒) & ⊢ (𝜓 ↔ 𝜃) ⇒ ⊢ (∀∃!𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ ∀∃!𝑥 ∈ 𝐴(𝜒 → 𝜃)) | ||
| Theorem | nfalseu 17394 | Bound-variable hypothesis builder for "all some one". This is the "all some one" counterpart of nfals 17363. Unlike the set.mm version of this theorem, no disjoint variable condition is needed, because nfeu 2105 here does not require one. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥𝜑 & ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥𝜓 ⇒ ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥∀∃!𝑦(𝜑 → 𝜓) | ||
| Theorem | nfralseu 17395* | Bound-variable hypothesis builder for "all some one" restricted to a class. This is the "all some one" counterpart of nfrals 17364. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥𝐴 & ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥𝜑 & ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥𝜓 ⇒ ⊢ Ⅎ𝑥∀∃!𝑦 ∈ 𝐴(𝜑 → 𝜓) | ||
| Theorem | dfalseu2 17396 |
An "all some one" statement is equivalent to its universal part
conjoined
with the claim that exactly one 𝑥 satisfies both 𝜑 and 𝜓.
In other words, given ∀𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓), requiring exactly one 𝑥
to satisfy 𝜑, which is what df-alseu 17381 requires, and requiring
exactly one 𝑥 to satisfy (𝜑 ∧ 𝜓) come to the same thing.
Read 𝜑 as "is a king" and 𝜓 as
"is hungry": if every king is
hungry, then "there is exactly one king" and "there is
exactly one hungry
king" say the same thing, so either of them, together with
"every king is
hungry", gives "the king is hungry".
The universal conjunct is what makes that work, and it cannot be dropped. ∃!𝑥(𝜑 ∧ 𝜓) on its own is strictly weaker than ∀∃!𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓), since it is satisfied when many things are 𝜑 and just one of those is 𝜓, as in a region with five kings exactly one of whom is hungry; see alseueu 17397 for the one direction that does hold without it. Uniqueness attaches to the antecedent, not to the conjunction. Russell's analysis of a definite description is built the same way: its uniqueness clause constrains the description predicate alone, while the predication is a separate conjunct. See his worked example of "the father of Charles II was executed", [Russell1905] p. 482. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃!𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) ↔ (∀𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) ∧ ∃!𝑥(𝜑 ∧ 𝜓))) | ||
| Theorem | alseueu 17397 | "The 𝜑 is 𝜓 " implies that exactly one thing is both 𝜑 and 𝜓. This is the half of dfalseu2 17396 that drops the universal conjunct; it does not reverse, so ∃!𝑥(𝜑 ∧ 𝜓) cannot be used in place of an "all some one" statement. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ (∀∃!𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) → ∃!𝑥(𝜑 ∧ 𝜓)) | ||
| Theorem | alseu-no-surprise 17398 | Demonstrate that there is never a "surprise" when using the "all some one" quantifier, that is, it is never possible for the consequent to be both always true and always false. This follows from als-no-surprise 17366 by alseuals 17384. See als-no-surprise 17366 for why ordinary "for all" with implication has no such property. (Contributed by David A. Wheeler, 22-Jul-2026.) |
| ⊢ ¬ (∀∃!𝑥(𝜑 → 𝜓) ∧ ∀∃!𝑥(𝜑 → ¬ 𝜓)) | ||
| < Previous Wrap > |
| Copyright terms: Public domain | < Previous Wrap > |